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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of the rapid expansion of Chinese engagement in the African 
continent. This engagement is characterised by ‘trade, investment, foreign aid and government-sponsored bilateral 
cooperation’ which is highly varied, politicised, and wrought with scrutiny. 
It is important to stress that China’s role and its implications vary between countries due to differing socio-political, economic 
and environmental contexts. Therefore, this paper will focus on three examples of China’s development ‘partnerships’: Angola, 
Ethiopia and Zambia. Angola will be used to analyse China’s oil-backed infrastructure projects. Ethiopia will be explored to 
challenge allegations of China’s purely extractive agenda as it is a non-oil exporting developmental state which uses Chinese 
‘assistance’ to overcome problems of poverty and food insecurity.  Zambia will be used to discuss detriments of Chinese 
engagement.  
This paper concludes Chinese engagement in Africa to be multifaceted in light of her varied ‘development partnerships’, seen 
through the Angolan, Ethiopian and Zambian case studies. Sino-Ethiopian and Sino-Zambian relations particularly highlight 
the varied implications of Chinese engagement. In light of domestic and international backlash particularly regarding treatment 
of workers in Chinese owned factories in Zambia, the Chinese are working to sweeten perceptions with public health 
investment and campaigns. This illustrates dynamism in Chinese engagement which, this paper concludes, will sustain China’s 
role in Africa. 
 





China’s economic and political presence in Africa 
has been longstanding, dating back to the 15th 
century (Obiorah, 2007). However, China’s rapidly 
increasing engagement in the continent over the past 
two decades –which involves ‘trade, investment, 
foreign aid and government-sponsored bilateral 
cooperation’ (Brautigam and Tang 2012: 2)- is 
highly varied, politicised, and wrought with scrutiny 
regarding her role and its implications for the 
continent.  
 
China is among a group of emerging ‘development 
partners’, including Brazil, India and Saudi Arabia, 
which are not members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and are redefining traditional concepts of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). The 
OECD (2018) define ODA as ‘official finance 
seeking to promote economic development and 
welfare that is concessional in character and 
contains a grant element of at least 25 percent’.  
 
Non-DAC Donors (NDDs) and in particular, China, 
are keen to distance themselves from the 
institutionalisied DAC philosophy of aid-giving and 
its subsequent asymmetrical power dynamics; 
NDDS are altering the types of conditionalities -or 
lack thereof- attached to their assistance, and 
combining concessional loans with grants of food 
aid and technical and humanitarian assistance 
(Mawdsley, 2012). Chinese rhetoric also 
emphasises a ‘South-South’ partnership of 
development built on ‘principles of mutual respect; 
reciprocal benefits; respect for sovereignty; and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of partners, 
quite the opposite of the paternalistic and 
‘conditionality’-based partnership practiced by 
Western donors’ (Cheru, 2016: 592-593).  
 
Despite significant media attention surrounding the 
implications of Sino-African engagement, 
quantifying the ‘assistance’ remains difficult and 
contested. However, AidData has collated vast 
amounts of information and estimates Chinese 
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development assistance to Africa at nearly US$100 
billion between 2000-2013 (Constantaras, 2016).  
It is important to stress that China’s role and 
implications in Africa vary between countries given 
the different socio-political, economic and 
environmental contexts. Therefore, this paper will 
focus on three examples of China’s development 
‘partnerships’: Angola, Ethiopia and Zambia. 
Angola will be used to analyse China’s oil-backed 
infrastructure projects. Ethiopia will be used to 
challenge allegations of China’s purely extractive 
agenda as it is a non-oil exporting developing 
country which uses Chinese ‘assistance’ to 
overcome problems of poverty and food insecurity 
(Alemu and Scoones, 2013). Zambia will be used to 
discuss the negative aspects of Chinese engagement.  
 
Sino-African relations can be characterised by 
political, economic and military-related ‘mutual’ 
interests (Hanauer and Morris, 2014). Economic 
pursuits remain paramount, be that the developing 
goals of African nations or China’s quest for raw 
materials to fuel its ongoing industrialisation and 
‘going out’ strategy (ibid.). 
 
2. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
2.1 China in Angola 
 
Angola’s wealth of oil reserves has attracted 
substantial Chinese investment, primarily through 
oil-backed infrastructure projects which began 
during the country’s 2002 post-civil war 
reconstruction. A US$2 billion, twelve-year, loan 
issues in 2002 by China Exim Bank guaranteeing a 
daily supply of 10,000 barrels of oil in exchange for 
transportation infrastructure illustrates this (Tan-
Mullins et al., 2010). 
 
Many African officials massively support Chinese 
investment and cooperation. For example, in a 
meeting with the Chinese foreign minister, Angola’s 
President Lourenco thanked China for her crucial 
role in post-war reconstruction and encouraged 
continuing large-scale infrastructure projects (Liu, 
2018). Furthermore, Hanauer and Morris (2014: 10) 
argue African leaders use Chinese backing as 
justification for their leadership; former Angolan 
President Eduardo dos Santos hailed a Chinese 
building project as evidence of implementation of 
his campaign promise to increase social housing 
(ibid.). However, this project could be characterised 
as a ‘white elephant’ investment (Dreher et al., 
2017: 2) and a waste of public resources. The 
US$3.5 billion contract with China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation built a ‘virtual 
ghost town’ (Hanauer and Morris, 2014: 52) –
schools, roads, homes, electricity networks- with 
apartments selling for US$120,000 to US$200,000 
despite 60% of Angolans live on no more than US$2 
a day (Hanauer and Morris, 2014). Not only is this 
categorically not social housing, but 12,000 Chinese 
workers were employed for its construction (ibid.).  
 
Employment of Chinese workers in Africa –roughly 
225, 000 in 2016 (China Africa Research Initiative, 
2018)- remains a point of tension. Often, one of the 
few conditions for Chinese investment is the 
employment of Chinese –and sometimes Pakistani- 
workers. This is to generate greater employment 
opportunities for Chinese firms as part of the ‘going 
out’ strategy. This directly contradicts China’s 
pledge to listen to the job creation goals of its 
‘partners’. The opinions of ‘ordinary’ Africans are 
founded on the level and quality of job creation 
(Hanauer and Morris, 2014). Thus, tensions rise as 
issues of unemployment –for example, youth 
unemployment which is at 19% in Angola (World 
Bank, 2018)- are ignored and a substantial 
proportion of the growing population remains 
unproductive. When Africans are employed, it is as 
unskilled, low wage labour while Chinese workers –
essentially economic migrants- are given 
managerial roles.  
 
The economic logic behind China’s emphasis on 
infrastructural development in Africa is evident: the 
continent continues to suffer from an infrastructural 
gap, ‘while China has developed one of the world’s 
largest and most competitive construction 
industries’ (Hanauer and Morris, 2014: 35). 
Infrastructure development is described as the 
‘hardware of economic development’ (Dreher et al. 
2017: 1). Hanauer and Morris (2014) suggest mutual 
potential benefits: improved extraction and 
transportation facilities enable ease of access and 
distribution and therefore can bolster intra-African 
trade and connectivity (Hanauer and Morris, 2014)- 
depending on whether African nations have any 
natural resources left to extract and trade for 
themselves.  
 
There has been widespread dissatisfaction with the 
poor quality of Chinese infrastructure (ibid.). For 
example, Hanauer and Morris (2014: 62) cite the 
African media station Pambazuka News to have 
reported ‘Chinese-built roads in Angola “washed 
away after one rainy season”’. Having said that, the 
Angolan government requested rapid and low-cost 
construction ‘in order to show results in the run-up 
to an election’ (ibid.). Again, Chinese investment is 
used to legitimise African officials’ political 
campaigns rather than truly benefit the citizens. 
Hence, some critics argue Chinese assistance only 
‘assists’ the economic and political elite and is, 
therefore, unequally distributed. Further to this, a 
report by Dreher et al., (2016) revealed a great 
proportion of Chinese aid resources in the 
hometowns of African heads of state, again relaying 
the extent to which beneficiaries from development 
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assistance are among, or connected to, the political 
and economic elites. This means money often does 
not reach where it is most needed and thus, does not 





2.2 China in Ethiopia 
 
Over the past decade, millions of Ethiopians have 
been lifted out of poverty. This is partly due to the 
developmental state’s success in harnessing 
strategic relations with donors such as China to 
‘unleash the country’s productive potential while 
maintaining national policy space’ (Cheru, 2016: 
592), largely due to the ‘expansion of agriculture, 
construction and services’ (World Bank, 2018).  
 
A significant aspect of China’s role in Ethiopia is 
her investment in the agricultural industry. Chinese 
rhetoric claims her foreign policy achieves 
‘development effectiveness’, rather than ‘aid 
effectiveness’ (Omoruyi et al., 2017). This is 
arguably achieved through a goal-orientated 
approach which is mindful of the recipient’s goals 
whether they be economic growth or employment 
creation. For example, China was bilaterally 
involved in Ethiopia’s first and second Growth and 
Transformation Plans – 2010- 15 and 2015-20 -
which was central to the state’s goal of transforming 
the economy through industrialisation of the 
agricultural sector (Cheru, 2016). To achieve this, 
the government aimed to attract foreign investment 
for infrastructural development as it was seen as a 
cornerstone of economic growth.  
 
China’s investment focused on ‘infrastructure, 
agricultural technology and skills transfer’ (Alemu 
and Scoones, 2013: 1). Between 2001 and 2011, 25 
Technical and Vocational Training schools were 
established in Ethiopia and over 200 Chinese 
experts taught technical agricultural theory and 
practical knowledge (Brautigam and Tang, 2012): 
skills transfer. In 2006, as per Ethiopia’s request, 
China built the Ethiopia-China Agricultural 
Technology Demonstration Center to encourage 
‘transfer of physical agricultural technologies and 
knowledge (…) (and expand) local capacity 
building’ (Alemu and Scoones, 2013: 7). This 
infrastructure was intended to be used in 
collaboration with the TVET scheme as a ‘trainer of 
trainers’ (Alemu and Scoones, 2013: 9), which 
would expand the domestic skilled workforce and 
enable sustainability in the development of 
Ethiopia’s agriculture sector.  
China has also had substantial involvement in 
financing the construction of numerous power 
plants, improving basic telecommunication services, 
and expanding Ethiopia’s transportation network, 
primarily in roads and railways. China’s 
‘development assistance’ is ‘hailed as the answer to 
Ethiopia’s key economic challenges’ (Omoruyi et 
al., 2017: 14), especially due to the country’s 
massive infrastructure deficit; Ethiopia has the 
lowest road density in Africa.  
 
Some analysts criticise China for striking unfair 
deals that take advantage of African governments’ 
relative weaknesses and liken the asymmetric power 
dynamics to perpetuate a neo-colonial relationship. 
For example, between 2005 and 2006 China 
launched a Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) to 
integrate the least developed countries (LDCs) –
Ethiopia, Angola and Zambia included (UNCTAD, 
2016)- into the global trading system. The scheme 
was marketed as aiming to expand market access for 
goods and services of LDCs using duty-free tariffs 
for imports and exports. The value of Sino-
Ethiopian trade rose 200% between 2009 and 2017, 
with total trade rising to US$6 billion in 2015 
(Omoruyi et al, 2017; OEC, 2018). Unfortunately, 
there is little evidence to show Ethiopian producers 
made any headway in the Chinese market. Instead, 
hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers 
and domestic producers were squeezed out of 
business by the ‘one-way traffic’ of cheap Chinese 
imports flooding the market (Hanauer and Morris, 
2014; Omoruyi et al, 2017: 13), challenging the 
Chinese ‘win-win’ rhetoric.  
 
2.3  China in Zambia 
 
This paper believes China’s role in Zambia has been 
mixed, but predominantly negative. On one hand, 
creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 
Africa from 2006, such as the Zambia-China 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, reportedly 
attracted over US$600 million and ‘created 
employment opportunities for more than 6,000 
Africans in the mining, engineering and 
construction sectors (Hanauer and Morris, 2014: 
39). However, as is often the case, jobs paid 
minimum wage (or less) with poor working 
conditions. 
 
Critics of China’s approach to Africa, for example, 
former Zambian President Michael Sata, have 
described Chinese extractive policies as equating to 
a second ‘scramble for Africa’, which perpetuates 
the fundamentally asymmetrical power dynamics of 
neo-colonialism: wealthy external powers extract 
natural resources and ‘cursed’ resource-rich African 
nations revert back to primary product dependency 
(Hanauer and Morris, 2014). Carmody (2008: 1200) 
emphasises the often overlooked cost of this rapid 
environmental depletion: ‘Africa is being 
impoverished’. China’s quest for the cheapest raw 
materials means she will remove herself once all 
resources have been extracted; her investment will 
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significantly reduce and the ‘partner’ will fall victim 
to the resource curse with little for long-term 
development. 
 
Chinese enterprise has had notoriously poor public 
relations and perceptions due to unapologetically 
profit-driven priorities; Chinese-owned copper 
mines, factories and facilities are perceived as 
dangerous and that African employees are 
underpaid, abused and prevented from achieving 
managerial level employment (Hanauer and Morris, 
2014).  
Firstly, a 2011 Human Rights Watch report 
highlighted the fact that employees of the Chinese-
operated Chambishi mine in Zambia were being 
paid less than similar labourers elsewhere in the 
country, thus clarifying Sata’s accusations of 
Chinese mining operators using Zambian workers as 
‘slave labour’ (Hanauer and Morris, 2014: 58).  
Secondly, there have been a host of high-profile 
tragedies which have drawn attention to the 
dangerous and abusive working conditions. For 
example, the during a strike over wage disputes at 
the Chambishi mine in July 2006, ‘Chinese 
supervisors shot a half-dozen local employees’ 
(Hanauer and Morris, 2014: 66). While the Chinese 
companies are largely to blame, it is likely that some 
African governments do not enforce their national 
labour laws and extraction regulations in an effort to 
retain Chinese investment and employment levels, 
probably to legitimise their role in power. 
 
 
3. China’s Changing Approach 
 
There has been a slight but significant shift in 
Chinese policy in Africa, as a result of the 
increasingly negative public opinion surrounding 
their engagement and subsequent anti-Chinese 
backlash and social unrest (Hanauer and Morris, 
2014). For example, China’s 2006 US$300 million 
anti-malaria campaign built prevention and 
treatment centres for diagnosis, treatment, capacity-
building and research (ibid.). Former Chinese 
President Hu Jintao emphasised a ‘new type of 
China-Africa strategic partnership’ (Hanauer and 
Morris, 2014: 73). This flexible and almost 
experimental Chinese attitude to development is 
completely different to that of Western institutes and 





The implications of Sino-African engagement have 
been profoundly varied. Some argue Chinese 
‘assistance’ has created jobs, developed much-
needed infrastructure and enabled transfer of skills 
and technologies, which could support future 
sustainable development. Others suggest China 
exploits the asymmetric power dynamics in her 
trade deals and ‘assistance’ conditionalities which 
have resulted in exploitation and abuse of the limited 
workforce she employs, the loss of hundreds of 
thousands of jobs due to cheap Chinese imports 
flooding recipient markets, and immense resource 
extraction which reinforces dependency on primary 
products and unskilled labour. Having said that, the 
Ethiopian case illustrates successful economic 
development without intensive extraction, but with 
skills transfers which create longevity for 
development. Furthermore, China’s understanding 
of the importance of positive partnerships, and her 
subsequent alteration in approach, suggests a 
learning curve with the potential for a truly ‘win-
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